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Abstract. Multi-service residential access networks allow residential cus-
tomers to choose amongst a variety of service offerings, over a range of
Core Networks and subject to user requirements such as QoS, mobility,
cost and availability. These issues place requirements on authentication
for network access, with a need for mutual authentication of the residen-
tial gateway (RG) to the local access point (LAP). The EU-IST project
TORRENT is building a testbed providing for multi-service residential
access networks in order to demonstrate the benefit of intelligent con-
trol, both for the customer and for the network operators and service
providers. Adequate security measures are essential in order to secure
access to the TORRENT system and services and for QoS provisioning
to authorised users. This paper examines the authentication issues for
the TORRENT system and presents a public key based authentication
protocol for mutually authenticating the RG and the LAP.
Keywords: Authentication, Public Key Infrastructure, Encryption, Res-
idential Gateway
1 Introduction
Multi-service residential access networks are concerned with exploiting the
use of shared physical access networks for a range of different services and traffic
types optimising bandwidth utilisation in existing access networks while meet-
ing user requirements related to QoS, security, cost and availability. In order
to deliver such offerings to the residential customers, an infrastructure is re-
quired mapping user requirements to the appropriate networks, services, and
applications. The infrastructure typically incorporates a residential gateway in
the home and one or more serving local access point(s)(LAP) integrating access
technologies with services and core networks. The residential gateway(RG) con-
nects the home network technologies (especially WLAN, Ethernet) to the access
network(s), e.g. cable and ISDN, xDSL and ISDN, or even LMDS. Functions
of the local access point may include providing customer negotiation facilities
and host accounting and security functionality (e.g., AAA services) of customer
access to e.g., metering, security, and monitoring.
This work has evolved from investigations in the TORRENT project of au-
thentication issues in multi-service residential access networks. In future multi-
service residential access networks, users may have the opportunity to choose
between several network operators and service providers. Authentication require-
ments of the different network operators and service providers can lead to the
situation that a user has to keep track of several different usernames and pass-
words and different methods of authenticating to the networks and services.
There is a need for a single mechanism for authentication, which gives the user
access to all services. For this, the mechanism should be suitable for services re-
quiring strong authentication (e.g. signing your loan application electronically).
This paper discusses the issues involved and presents our scheme for public-
key based authentication for which a smart card is used as certificate and key
container and may also be used for authentication to many services.
1.1 TORRENT Overview
TORRENT is an EU-supported Framework V project, aiming at building a
test-bed for multi-service residential access networks. This test-bed (Figure 1)
will allow the project to demonstrate the benefit of intelligent control, for the
customer, for the network operators and service providers. An important goal
is to optimise the bandwidth utilisation in existing access and core networks,
while at the same time meeting user requirements in an optimal manner. These
requirements include Quality of Service (QoS), security, cost, and availability.
Security is of major importance, and adequate security measures are essential
in order to secure access to the TORRENT system and services, and also for
provisioning QoS to authorised users.
IPv6 is integrated in TORRENT as a transport protocol and the IP Security
Protocol (IPsec) is used as a service for securing the data between the Residen-
tial Gateway (RG) and the Local Access Point (LAP). Investigations of various
authentication and key agreement schemes have been carried out in the IPsec
performance trials, as documented in [2].
The authentication requirements for the TORRENT system have been deter-
mined by a threat analysis. It was determined that the threats of masquerading
by LAP or RG can be mitigated by mutually authenticating the LAP and the
RG. Authentication is important e.g. to ensure that the authorised customer
behind an RG is getting the QoS that was requested, to reduce the likelihood of
fraud and also as a baseline for avoiding repudiation of messages e.g. payments.
Users and providers of networks and services will thus benefit from this security
service. A scheme for providing this will be presented later in the paper.
2 Background and objectives
This paper presents the work on authentication done in the TORRENT IST [8]



















Fig. 1. TORRENT Architecture
the LAP. It is a requirement to provide users with secure access to TORRENT
services. It is also a requirement to authenticate users accessing the system e.g.
to make changes to the user profile and user preferences (service subscription,
QoS, cost, etc.) It was also foreseen that if a hardware (HW) token is used as key
holder of the authentication exchange, then this HW token could also be used
for user authentication (of the RG user) and eCommerce applications. The same
token could be used for authentication and key exchange for the IPsec VPN
tunnel service. Certificates and associated private keys for authentication and
encryption of agents and agent communication can also be stored on the HW
token. In fact, certificates and associated private keys for the services of user au-
thentication, electronic signature, and encryption can be reused by TORRENT’s
agent based Service to Resource Management system for authentication of the
user agents. Therefore, public key techniques were explored early on in the TOR-
RENT project.
2.1 Assumptions
We make the following general assumptions about the TORRENT system:
– The link between the RG and LAP is vulnerable.
– The user access to the user profile interface is vulnerable.
– The link (not shown) between service domains (e.g., LAP to LAP) is vul-
nerable.
2.2 Security Objectives
Authentication is the verification of claimed identity, and can be either single-
sided or mutual. In TORRENT, authentication of the RG to the LAP is impor-
tant to prevent false or unauthorised RGs from registering and obtaining access
to the TORRENT system. Similarly, authentication of the LAP to the RG is
important, to prevent another device from masquerading as a real LAP in order
to intercept user traffic and private information. It is feasible that an RG owner
can subscribe to services on different LAPs, which increases the risk of such a
masquerade attack. Authentication of the user behind the RG to the subscriber
interface is also important e.g. to prevent unauthorised changes to the user pref-
erences and possibly fraud. Authentication of agents to each other in the agent
system is also required to prevent manipulation of traffic sent between agents.
Authentication of agents is addressed in [4].
2.3 Enabling Quality Of Service
Authentication alone will not guarentee that the customer receives the QoS that
was requested. However, assuming that QoS mechanisms are in place to maintain
and control the quality of service, mutual entity authentication is an important
countermeasure to a number of threats to QoS provisioning.
For example, if authentication of the RG to the LAP is insufficient, an at-
tacker may make a distributed attack from many false RGs allocating a substan-
tial number of QoS enabled flows, which binds up the resources and degrades
the performance for authorised user flows. An important mitigating measure to
counter this attack is mutual authentication of the RG and the LAP. In the case
of the TORRENT project, the user may select a level of QoS on a per service ba-
sis via a GUI hosted on the LAP. Sufficient authentication of the user for access
to the GUI and integrity protection of the communication on the link between
the RG and the LAP is required to prevent unauthorised users from registering
using an authorised customers ID and masquerading in order to obtain a higher
level of QoS without paying for it.
3 Authentication and key agreement based on public key
techniques
In this section we will discuss the case for public key authentication techniques
for network access.
3.1 Background
Historically, authentication for network access has been done using shared se-
cret techniques and this has proven to be scalable. For ISDN and now ADSL
the residential user is issued a terminal per service (NT box for ISDN, ADSL
modem for ADSL). ADSL modem authentication is at best, password based and
open to dictionary attacks when the password is small or insufficiently random.
Requirements have been lax: it is well known that most ADSL modems can be
hacked without requiring sophistication [5]. It is well known that 2G and 3G
mobile telecommunication systems use secret key techniques for network access.
As the number of access networks increases scalabity issues become more sig-
nificant. In GSM, for example, scalability is achieved using brokers and roaming
agreements. A small operator has an agreement with a roaming broker, which
establishes roaming agreements with a lot of other operators. It can be argued
that as the number of operators and roaming agreements grows significantly,
then these bilateral agreements may be inefficient and costly to maintain. But
essentially, scalability issues alone do not provide a strong argument for the case
for public key techniques for network access.
Public key techniques were ruled out early on in the 3G design and standard-
isation process as these were considered too complex and seemed to require too
much computational overhead. Since then, however, public key based mecha-
nisms have been successfully implemented in the GSM SIM card for e.g. mCom-
merce and in smartcards [6], demonstrating that computational overhead is no
longer an issue.
The strong arguments for public key techniques are scalability and to some
extent mobility (of the user to choose freely between networks and service
providers), and the elegance of the reusability of public key techniques for a
multitude of services such as authentication, and key exchange, notary public
services, eCommerce, mCommerce, and electronic signatures. Use of public key
techniques is also motivated in part by stronger requirements for user anonymity
— public key authentication offers possibilities for providing strong user iden-
tity and location confidentiality as the user id and location information does not
need to be transmitted in the clear over the network. For example, the public
key of the authorised receiving party can be used to encrypt the identity and
other private information belonging to the user.
Another benefit of using public key techniques is that the mechanism can
also be re-used (e.g. for application security, electronic signature, and electronic
payment) this will be described in more detail later in the paper.
4 Authentication in TORRENT
In this section we will propose a scheme for public key authentication for securing
network access from the user of the RG to the LAP.
The LAP is fitted with a hardware key container with a (possibly several)
server certificate(s) and associated private key(s). A smartcard as certificate and
key container is inserted in the RG. The user behind the RG has a relationship
with a trusted third party (certificate validator/broker).
At least one X.509 certificate and associated pair of keys are stored on the
smartcard for authentication and encryption purposes (actually, the public key
is contained in the certificate, while the private key is not). The trusted third
party’s public key certificate is also stored on the smartcard to enable validation
of foreign incoming certificates.
The RG user Smartcard contains a certificate binding the RG user to a
public key suitable for both encryption and signature verification (or it contains
two separate certificates). The LAP has a certificate binding the LAP operator
to certificate issued by a Certificate Authority (CA). The CVC functions as a
trusted third party and has an agreement with the CA that issued the certificate
to the LAP allowing it to perform certificate validation services on behalf of the
CA, and it also has such an agreement with the CA that issued the certificate(s)
to the RG user. The CVC public key is installed on the RG user smartcard a
priori. Note, it is feasible that the RG user may have the public keys of several
CVCs installed on their smartcard.
The aim is to mutually authenticate the RG and the LAP using public key
techniques. The motivation for this is the case that the user of the RG does not
have to be bound to a Service Provider or Operator (by a subscription) but is
free to shop around for network access and services. In this case, shared secret
keying techniques are not appropriate. It should be noted that this algorithm
can be applied to both wired and non-wired network access.
Use of public key techniques for network access has been studied in the
SHAMAN project [7] and two methods for authentication and key agreement
using public key techniques are described. The protocol presented in this pa-
per is different from those presented by SHAMAN. In the method described in
SHAMAN the mobile node has a subscription to a home operator, and must es-
tablish network access with an access network, which has an agreement with the
home operator or a roaming broker. This network access point (e.g. LAP) has
a number of pre-installed public key certificates (signed by each trusted third
party or home network with which it has an agreement). The access network
sends the appropriate one to the node (e.g. RG) and this is used by the node to
assure the node that a roaming agreement exists with the home network.
In the TORRENT case, however, the user does not necessarily have a re-
lationship/subscription to a home network, nor does the LAP have to have an
agreement with other access network operators. Both must have X.509 certifi-
cates that can be validated by a trusted third party, which we call a Certificate
Validation Clearinghouse/broker (CVC). It is the Certificate Authority’s public
key that is pre-installed in the RG key holder (probably a smartcard) and which
is used in the validation process. The CVC validates the RG user’s certificate
on behalf of the Certificate Authority for the LAP, and the LAP’s certificate on
behalf of the RG.
Public key techniques are used to mutually authenticate the LAP to the
RG and the RG to the LAP using a trusted third party called the CVC. The
CVC can function as a broker and a clearinghouse. This differs from the method
presented in SHAMAN [7]. In the case provided in [7], the Local Access Point has
a collection of certificates and must send the appropriate one to the RG. The RG
then validates the Local Access Point based on the certificate that it receives. In
the TORRENT protocol, it is the CVC that validates the LAP certificate for the
RG, and the CVC validates the RG certificate for the LAP. How this validation
is performed is outside of the scope of this paper: a thorough explanation can
be found in [3].
Once the certificate validation process is completed, the type of payment for
services (e.g., bandwidth, QoS, VPN) can be agreed using the preferred payment
method such as credit card, online banking, billing directly based upon some
method associated with the smartcard, etc. (again, the exact method used is
outside of the scope of this paper).
5 Protocol RRW strong two-way entity authentication
The basic protocol involves A (the RG User Smartcard), B (the LAP), and T
(the CVC server). At outset the RG User Smartcard contains at least one public
key pair suitable for both encryption and signature verification and in accor-
dance with X.509 standards. The RG user’s Smartcard must also acquire (and
authenticate) the CVC encryption public key a priori . The LAP has its public
key pair for signature and encryption. The CVC server has a public key pair for
signature and encryption. The CVC has an agreement with the CA that issued
the certificate to the LAP, allowing the CVC to validate on behalf of the CA
which issued the LAP certificate. The CVC also has an agreement with the CA
that issued the card to the user.
SUMMARY: RG User Smartcard interacts with a Trusted CVC server and LAP.
RESULT: mutual entity authentication.
1. Notation
A denotes the RG User Smartcard.
B denotes the LAP
T denotes the CVC server.
IT denotes the identification of the CVC so that the authentication request
can be sent to the correct CVC.
PX(y) denotes the result of applying X’s encryption public key to data y.
SX(y) denotes the result of applying X’s signature private key to data y.
(tX , rX) denote the challenge and response pair generated by X.
Let rTX denote the response generated by T to the challenge of X.
CertX is a certificate binding party X to a public key suitable for both
encryption and signature verification. Remark: A good practice is to
avoid using the same cryptographic key for multiple purposes.
Let certXok denote the “CertX has been validated
2. System Setup
a) Each party has its public key pair for signature and encryption.
b) The encryption public key of the CVC is installed on the RG user Smart-
card a priori.
c) The CVC server has an agreement with the Certificate Authority (CA)
that issued A’s public key certificate(s) allowing the CVC to validate
A’s certificate on behalf of the CA, and similarly with the Certificate
Authority that issued B’s public key certificate.
3. Protocol messages
A←− B : CertB , SB(tB) (1)
A −→ B : CertA (2)
A −→ B : PT (CertA, SA(tA), CertB , SB(tB)), IT (3)
B −→ T : PT (CertA, SA(tA), CertB , SB(tB)) (4)
A←− T : PA(certBok, rTA) (5)
B ←− T : PB(certAok, rTB) (6)
4. Protocol actions
a) On request from A, B creates challenge and response pair (tB , rB), signs
the challenge and sends the signed challenge with its public-key certifi-
cate to A. (1)
b) A sends (2), its public-key certificate to B
c) A creates challenge and response pair (tA, rA). A encrypts a message for
the CVC server T containing A’s public-key certificate (CertA), A’s gen-
erated and signed challenge (SA(tA)), B’s public-certificate (CertB) and
B’s generated and signed challenge (SB(tB)). This combined message is
sent along with the CVC identification IT to B (for relaying to T ).
d) B uses the cleartext identifier in message (3) to relays the encrypted data
containing A’s public-key certificate (CertA), A’s generated and signed
challenge SA(tA), B’s public-certificate (CertB) and B’s generated and
signed challenge SB(tB) to T .
e) T decrypts (4) using its private decryption key. T validates CertA, CertB ,
and the signatures of the two challenges. If all checks succeed, Validation
yields two messages: “CertA has been validated” and “CertB has been
validated” . T also computes the response rTA to A’s challenge tA, and
the response rTB to B’s challenge tB and sends (5) to A and (6) to B.
f) A decrypts (5) and checks that rTA = rA. If decryption is successfull and
all checks succeed, A declares authentication of B successful.
g) B decrypts (6) and checks that rTB = rB . If decryption is successful and
the check succeeds, B declares authentication of A successful.
Note: Upon authentication, A and B may proceed directly with a key-
exchange for IPsec. The symmetric VPN session key is not embedded in the
above protocol as is the case with the Kerberos protocol as we have determined
that the CVC shouldn’t know what the session key would be. With Kerberos,
two session keys are optionally generated: one by the trusted third party, and a
subsession key shared by A and B, but not chosen by T . In both cases the CVC
is aware of the session key. As the session key may be used for encryption over
weeks, even months, it is unnecessary for the CVC to be aware of this key. Upon
authentication, then A and B should proceed directly with a key-exchange for
IPsec.






























































Fig. 2. Authentication Process information flow
5.1 Periodic Validation
To prevent redirection of the communications channel once authentication has
been completed, it is necessary to periodically ensure that the authenticated
parties are still in control of the communications channel. The method used
here is a periodic “challenge-response” from LAP to the Card in the RG.
This challenge is encrypted using the Card’s public key (as obtained by the
LAP during authentication), and can be as simple as a series of numbers from
which the card must calculate a result. The card will then encrypt this result
using the LAP’s public key (as received from the LAP during authentication).
If the LAP does not receive the correct result from the card within a rea-
sonable amount of time, the LAP will cease routing traffic to or from the RG
containing the non-responsive card. Conversely, if the Card does not receive a
challenge from the LAP within a reasonable time, it will disable the RG interfaces
on the assumption that the LAP has either failed or has been compromised.
6 Feasibility
The greatest barrier to implementation of this system is the ability of the smart
card processor to perform the necessary encryption and decryption operations.
The protocol, as presented, requires the smart card to perform one encryption
and one decryption. These operations must be performed on-card, as the RG in
which the card sits is a non-trusted system.
6.1 Encryption Algorithm
Because of the limited computational power of the smart card processor, a
computationally-light, but still secure encryption scheme is required. Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC)[13] offers strength at least equal to the more widely-
deployed RSA. However, ECC requires shorter key lengths and lower computa-
tional load [?] [ref to report to back this up], and as such would be an ideal
candidate for use in the system described here.
6.2 Smart Card Performance
The encryption and decryption operations performed by the card are not time-
critical: because authentication is not performed regularly, a time of up to three
seconds from card insertion (a similar performance to most pay TV systems) is
acceptable and easily achievable.
Current microprocessor smart cards can already be used for key generation
and encryption using ECC techniques, and so are well able to perform the en-
crypt/decrypt operations required by the protocol presented here.[15][16].
6.3 Threat analysis
The primary weakness in this system, as in all trusted-party systems, is the
integrity of the CVC server. However, assuming that the operator of the CVC
Server takes adequate measures to protect it from subversion, destruction or
replacement, a potential attacker is left with only three other targets: the smart
card, the RG, and the LAP. Each of these is examined in turn.
Smart Card The Smart card is a closed computer system (with CPU, RAM,
ROM), whose only means of communication with the RG —and via the RG,
the network — is via a simple serial data link [?]. The firmware running on the
smart-card card CPU controls what information is sent along this serial link to
the RG.
The smart card private key and public key are written into on-card read-only
memory during manufacture. The software on the smart card will never cause
the private key to be sent out of the card, and there is no other way to access the
on-card memory without resorting to industrial disassembly of the card chip.
Messages from the smart card to the LAP and CVC are encrypted on the
card before being passed to the RG for transmission. The exception to this is
the initial exchange of certificates between smart card and LAP, when the smart
card sends its X.509 certificate in “clear text”. However, the only information of
consequence in this certificate is the card’s public key, disclosure of which does
not compromise the safety of the card’s private key.[11]
To defeat counterfeit cards, the smart card signs its challenge to the CVC
using the card’s own private key — a counterfeit card will not have this key, and
so cannot generate a correctly-signed challenge message.
RG The Residential Gateway is probably the most physically insecure part
of the system. The RG is envisioned as a mass-produced, dedicated computer
system, based on open-standards. As such, the RG is susceptible to substitution:
a malicious user can create their own fraudulent RG using a general purpose PC
and a smart-card interface. It is precisely for this reason that the protocol as
presented here assumes that the RG is a hostile party in the system.
No critical messages are passed to the RG without first being encrypted. The
RG can choose not to forward these messages, but this will result in a denial of
service, as the LAP will not enable the RG to LAP link until authentication is
complete.
Authentication messages arriving into the RG are encrypted, with the excep-
tion of the LAP’s certificate received during initial certificate exchange. However,
the LAP appendeds a signed (by the LAP) challenge message to its certificate
in order to prevent tampering with this message by the RG (or the smart card).
It is conceivable that a tampered RG could be re-programmed to perform
authentication once with a legitimate card inserted, and then remain on-line
indefinitely, regardless of the presence of the smart card. The periodic validation
scheme (§5.1) is designed to defeat this attack: without a legitimate card in the
RG to answer the challenge of the LAP, the RG will quickly be disconnected
from the network.
LAP The LAP is a dedicated computer system owned and maintained by the
network operator, and located on their property. As such, the LAP is a less
attractive target for direct attack than the RG or smart card. However, where
a shared-medium network (e.g., CATV cable) serves the LAP and RGs, the risk
of LAP substitution arises.
In order to defeat a user who sets up a fraudulent LAP and replays the
genuine LAP’s contributions to the authentication protocol, the genuine LAP
appends a challenge message to the certificate it passes to the smart card during
the initial LAP/Card certificate exchange. This challenge is signed using the
LAP’s private key, which allows the CVC to determine its veracity (the LAP’s
public key forms part of the LAP certificate).
The operator of a fraudulent LAP cannot send the genuine LAP’s certificate
without an accompanying challenge; and they cannot send the challenge unless
it is signed with the LAP’s private key, which they do not have access to.
If a LAP’s private key is somehow disclosed, the compromised LAP can be
issued with a new key pair, and the CVC server can reject any messages signed
with the old, compromised, private key. No change is necessary to the smart
cards, as they do not store LAP information.
7 State and Sequence Diagrams
Figure ?? shows the authentication progression. The two alternative sections
show possible deviations in authentication progression, depending on validity of
LAP or Card.
The UML state diagram in Figure 7 shows how the CVC validates the RG
certificate and LAP certificates contained in the encrypted message, which is





sd Certificate Exchange and Validation
:CVC
Encr (CertLAP, CertCARD, tA )
generate
challenge/response (tA, rA)






Card inserted in RG
Fig. 3. Sequence for initial LAP/Card certificate exchange
8 Comparison with existing schemes
The proposal is similar to Kerberos[10] in that it involves a party A interacting
with a trusted server T and a party B. The encryption algorithm of Kerberos
is symmetric, and public key techniques are not involved. A ticket is generated
which allows A to re-use the ticket for multiple authentications to B without
involving T .
In our approach, multiple authentications are not necessary. The heartbeat
function allows the RG and LAP to communicate over long periods of time
without requiring re-authentication. Once authentication is finished, the Card
still keeps listening on a socket for an occasional ”heartbeat” request from the
LAP/Authentication server. So even if the card is whipped out without being
able to send the ”Disable Services” message to the RG (or if the RG has been
tampered with to ignore this message), the LAP will quickly realise the card
is no longer in the RG, and thus will stop routing the RG’s traffic.
9 Re-usability of the certificates and keys
In this section we give a few examples of how the certificates and keys can be
reused for securing other functions of the TORRENT system, for user authenti-
cation, application security, eCommerce, etc.
As explained above, the customer behind the RG has a smartcard inserted
in the RG. The smartcard contains at least one X.509 certificate and associated
asymmetric keys. The certificate belongs to the customer and is linked to the
:CARD :LAP :CVC
ref
Certificate Exchange and Validation
sd Successful authentication of LAP and CARD







Encrypt (CertLAP OK, rT)
Fig. 4. Sequence for authentication process — normal operation
customer profile database. Depending on the certificate policy, the customer
may have to present themselves in person to the CVC to register and receive the
certificate and keys. The card and accompanying certificate(s) and keys may be
used for authenticating the RG to the LAP, and for key exchange for setting up
the IPsec VPN as a confidentiality service for securing the access link between
the RG and the LAP [2]. Using Qualified Certificates the smartcard may even
be fit for the purpose of creating electronic signatures [12] [17].
In the TORRENT system, a user interface can be used to select services and
mark preferences. In its simplest form the user profile interface will contain a list
of accessible services with options for the user to select preferred services and
maximum tariffs. For some services different quality levels may be distinguished.
The X.509 certificate may also be used for customer authentication at login time
(through digital signature) e.g. so that the user can securely access their profile
and make changes. If the changes made need to be signed, the user can also sign
them electronically at this point, provided that the card contains a certificate
that can be used for electronic signature. It can also be foreseen that pay-per-
use services can be provided on this interface and that the user can provide
an electronic signature for payment purposes. In current solutions, payment is
bundled with PKI in a way that money may be transferred to a service provider
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Encrypt (CertCARD Not OK)
{CertCARD is not valid }
Fig. 5. Sequence for authentication process — invalid card
10 Conclusion
10.1 Discussion
In this research we focus on mutual authentication procedure between the cus-
tomer’s residential gateway and the Local Access Point using a proposed authen-
tication protocol that combines techniques that are already proven to be reliable
(X.509 certificates, smartcards, public key cryptography). The motivation comes
from a requirement of the TORRENT IST project for a method of mutually au-
thenticating a residential gateway (in the home) and a local access point (in the
operator’s premises). Bearing in mind that with future multi-service residential
access networks, users may have — or demand — the facility to choose between
several network operators and service providers.
The authentication requirements of the different operators and providers can
lead to a situation where the user has to keep track of several combinations
of usernames and passwords which becomes much more difficult to manage as
time progresses. The process described in this paper proposes a scheme in an
attempt to solve these issues for the TORRENT project and other deployments
of LAP/RG types of systems. The process can also be applied to authenthicate
to, and access mobile access networks, e.g. for use in 3G and future networks
where the smart card may be used for authentication to many services.
:CARD :LAP :CVC
ref
Certificate Exchange and Validation
sd Authentication of LAP not successful







Encrypt (CertLAP Not OK, rT)
Fig. 6. Sequence for authentication process — invalid LAP
10.2 Related Work
Use of public key authentication and key exchange for network access has been
studied in the IST-SHAMAN project [7] and two methods for achieving this are
described. The protocol presented in this paper is different from those presented
by SHAMAN. In the first method described in SHAMAN the mobile node has
a subscription to a home operator, and must establish network access with an
access network, which has an agreement with the home operator or a roaming
broker. This network access point (e.g. LAP) has a number of pre-installed pub-
lic key certificates (signed by each trusted third party or home network with
which it has an agreement). The access network sends the appropriate one to
the node (e.g. RG) and this is used by the node to assure the node that a roam-
ing agreement exists with the home network. Our method does not require such
an agreement, and pre-installation of home network operator certificates on the
LAP is also not required. As the LAP operates in a multi-provider environment,
this scheme could quickly lead to a situation for which the LAP is overloaded
by certificate processing.
The second method described in SHAMAN differs also from our work in
that it does not require client authentication. This method is concerned with
providing anonymous access to the network based on immediate payment for
services and therefore does not require authentication of the client. This method
is purely concerned with authenticating the network.
The WLAN Smartcard Consortium, which was established in February 2003,
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Fig. 7. CVC Authentication state graph
works using smartcard security in order to provide privacy, roaming and related
capabilities. As this group is recently established, the specifications are not pub-
licly available at this time. It is projected by the Consortium that they will be
available by the end of the 2003.
Similarly, the ETSI AT NGNHome has announced plans for work on a de-
liverable entitled “Access and Terminals (AT); Home Area Networks and the
support of Next Generation Services; Part 6: Security and Copyright issues” [9].
The intention is to outline the security and copyright (including Digital Rights
Management and Privacy) issues related to the support and delivery of Next
Generation Services and applications both to and within a Home Area Network.
10.3 Future Work
Future work will include schemes for using the Smartcard to gain secure access
to a service at a chosen QoS class. Methods for protection of personal privacy
will also be investigated. In the age of full IPv6 deployment, it is envisioned that
protection of personal privacy can be made much easier. Today, with unlisted
numbers, as soon as the number becomes known, it has to be changed. With
IPv6, and certificates, IP addresses can be public, but the certificate, coupled
with public key techniques, can be used to govern what traffic is allowed in,
and what traffic should be prohibited. Only users with approved certificates can
reach (and communicate with the user at) the destination IP address.
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2. Ronan J, Malone P, Ó Foghlú M, Overhead Issues for Local Access Points in IPsec
enabled VPNs, IPS Workshop, Salzburg, February 2003. Retreived: 3. April, 2003
from http://www.ist-intermon.org/workshop/papers/09 01 vpn-overhead.pdf
3. Ølnes J, Trusted Certificate Validation Services – Breaking the PKI Deadlock,
jon.olnes@validsign.com , http://www.validsign.com, 10. October 2002
4. Houmb, Siv Hilde. Security Issues in FIPA Agents, paper in progress.
5. Cert Advisory CA-2001-08, Multiple Vulnerabilities in Alcatel
ADSL Modems, April 12 2001. Retreived: 3. April, 2003 from
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-08.html
6. Schlumberger, Schlumberger Smart cards Cryptoflex Home Page, Retreived: April
3, 2003 from http://www.cryptoflex.com/index.html
7. IST-SHAMAN Deliverable D09: Detailed Technical Specification of Security for
Heterogeneous Access, June 2002
8. TORRENT (Technology for a Realistic End User Access Network Test-bed), IST-
2000-25187. http://www.torrent-innovations.org
9. bleh http://portal.etsi.org/Portal Common/home.asp
10. Neuman B C and Ts’o T, “Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Computer
Networks”, IEEE Communications 32(9),pp 33–38. September 1994
11. Diffie W and Hellman M E, “New directions in cryptography”, IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory 22(1976), pp 644–654
12. EU Directive 1999/93 on Electronic Signatures ETSI TS 111 456 for Qualified
Certificates
13. Satoh T, Araki K, Miura S. “Overview of elliptic curve cryptography”, Proc.
PKC’98, LNCS 1431,pp. 29-49, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
14. Gupta V, Gupta S and Chang S Performance Analysis of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography for SSL ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), Mobicom
2002, Atlanta, Georgia, USA September. 2002. Retrieved 10. June 2003 from
http://research.sun.com/projects/crypto/performance.pdf
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